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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
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SUPREME COURT NO. 46674-2019
ADACOUNTYNO. CR0l-18-07930

vs.

JENNIFER NICOLE HULL,
Defendant-Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT JENNIFER NICOLE HULL

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
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District Judge
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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING MS. HULL'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
BECAUSE THE OFFICER'S CLAIM SHE WAS
REQUIRED TO SUBMIT TO THE BLOOD TEST RENDERED HER CONSENT
INVOLUNTARY UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES

One December evening, Jennifer's car left the road, rolled approximately seven times and
landed on its roof in a field. About an hour later, a police officer encountered Jennifer in the
emergency room, wearing a neck brace, in pain and with significant memory and attention
difficulties. Exhibit 6. The officer gave the ALS advisory as the nurse treated Jennifer's injuries.
When Jennifer asked if it was normal to give the officer blood, the officer and nurse instructed
Jennifer that she was required by law to submit to the blood test. Exhibit 6. The officer and nurse
reaffirmed their control over Jennifer, not allowing her to move and confirming she was not free
to leave. Jennifer thereafter acquiesced to the officer's claim of authority, notwithstanding
obvious discomfort and pleas for the blood draw to be over.
Because Jennifer's continuing consent was coerced, its use against her in criminal
proceedings offends due process and the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress. In
response, the state argues that whether the officer misinformed Jennifer that she could not refuse
is irrelevant because consent can only be rendered invalid by an affirmative revocation "refusal, protest, or objection." Respondent's Brief p. 7. However, consent- initially freely
given -

can become involuntary if it becomes coerced. Jennifer's implied consent ceased to be

voluntary when she was informed she was required by law to submit to the test and the officer's
subsequent conduct reinforced the mandatory nature of the test.
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Echoing the district court, the state also notes Jennifer did not present evidence of her
subjective state of mind-i.e. whether she believed she could revoke her consent after the officer
informed her the law required her to submit. Respondent's Brief p. 8, n.1. Jennifer does not, in
fact, remember her interaction with the officer. See Tr. p. 64, In. 1 - p. 65, In. 6.
More importantly, the state offers no authority suggesting the defendant's subjective

belief controls the totality of the circumstances analysis. Rather, it was Jennifer's subjective state
-

her head injury, memory loss and pain -

along with police tactics and questions, that was

pertinent to whether Jennifer's consent remained voluntary. See State v. Lutton, 161 Idaho 556,
560, 388 P.3d 71, 75 (Ct. App. 2017); State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97, 137 P.3d 481, 484 (Ct.
App. 2006).
Finally, the video recording establishes that Jennifer submitted to a painful blood draw
that she clearly did not want to endure because she was instructed the law required her
submission. When advised the blood draw could not be done from the IV and required another
"poke" with another "stick," Jennifer asked whether she had to "do it." Exhibit 6, 21 :40-21 :50.
During the process, she called out in pain: "Ah, yep don't like it. Ah I don't like it" and then
asked if it was over. Id. at 26:34-27:30. As the process dragged on, Jennifer asked for "someone"
and the nurse responded: "No you're fine sweet heart. I'm right here, I know it hurts." Id. at
29:05. Jennifer confirmed: "Yeah.... It hurts really bad" and the nurse again soothed:" I know
sweet heart." Id. at 27:34-29:25.
Jennifer acquiesced because the officer instructed her that she was required by law to
provide him with a blood sample. The totality of the circumstances establish that Jennifer's
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consent was involuntary and that the search and seizure of her blood unreasonable. The district
court erred in denying Jennifer's motion to suppress.
III. CONCLUSION

The district court erred in finding that Jennifer was required to affirmatively revoke
implied consent and that no evidence showed that Jennifer believed she was required to submit
to the blood test. Instead, the totality of the circumstances establish that Jennifer's mere
acquiescence to the officer's claim of authority was not voluntary consent and the district court
erred in denying Jennifer's motion to suppress. Accordingly, for all the reasons stated above and
in Jennifer's opening brief, this Court should vacate Jennifer's conviction and remand with
instruction to allow her to withdraw her guilty plea.
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of November 2019.
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